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THE STRAIGHT AND NARROW PATH 
Gerald T. .Dunne* 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW. 
By John Hart Ely. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
1980. Pp. viii, 268. Cloth $15; paper $6.95. 
Unfortunately, people who try to have it both ways wind up fre-
quently having it no way at all. There is a corollary: the centerline 
is the most dangerous spot on the highway. The latter consequence 
was duly noted by the Irish satirist, Honor Tracy, as an epigraph to 
her Straight and Narrow Path: ''What we have to do, my dear breth-
ren, is stay on the straight and narrow path between right and 
wrong."1 
Professor Ely, whom another Irishman, Jimmy Breslin, might de-
scribe as a mighty smooth article when it comes to words, seems to 
have ignored the injunction in his pioneering effort to suggest a fresh 
theory of judicial review. Ely divides perceptions of that phenome-
non into interpretivism and noninterpretivism, terms that are 
misleading and inadequate. Noninterpretivism is a solecism par ex-
ce//ance. Save in the sense of the Moliere character who was sur-
prised at speaking prose, how can anyone be a noninterpretivist of 
anything? The chasm is not terminological but historical. It sepa-
rates those who cast the federal judicial function in terms of fidelity 
to the original understanding and the received text from those who 
think that the Coustitution has given the federal courts what 
amounts to a roving commission to go forth and do good. Justice 
Harlan's ironic comment in Reynolds v. Sims "that every major so-
cial ill in this country can find its cure in some constitutional 'princi-
ple,' and that [the Supreme] Court should 'take the lead in 
promoting reform' when other branches of government fail to act"2 
well captures the spirit of the "roving commission" approach. 
Two better terms for the opposing sides of the faultline through 
American constitutional history - variously tagged as strict and lib-
eral construction, judicial activism and restraint, and (mutatis mutan-
dis) positivism and natural law-would be glossators and gnostics. 
The first group would take its name from the great school at 
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Bourges3 and at least presumes the existence of a text possessing nu-
clear meaning and for which contemporary glosses can be found. 
For the second category only "gnostic" will suffice, for it presupposes 
an infused knowledge derived from insightful faith alone. (Indeed, 
constitutionally, "illuminati" even though not alliterative might do 
even better.) Words aside, the verbal division overlays a political 
controversy, and a simple one: Does the Supreme Court of the 
United States sit as a judicial tribunal under article III of the Consti-
tution or as a plenary constitutional convention under article V? 
These binary possibilities seem to be reciprocally exclusive, but 
Professor Ely proposes a via media - that the Court should function 
as a convention and enlarge its own powers only to ensure opportu-
nity and not result. In sum, it should operate as a referee, indifferent 
to winners and concerned only with fair play. The theory is persua-
sively and appealingly presented, the author proposing (indeed prov-
ing) that any debate on interpretivism versus noninterpretivism is 
something of an intellectual suicide pact with rebuttals on both sides 
far more devastating than positive arguments. Those, for example, 
who perceive the Constitution as once and for all delivered to the 
saints to be interpreted to the letter, even if the heavens fall, contend 
with Chief Justice Taney's .Dred Scott opinion as a paradigm of in-
adequacy. Still more devastating to the gnostic cause and its inevita-
ble presumption and moral superiority is a gagline from one of Peter 
Arno's New Yorker cartoons. The drawing shows a formally clad 
society couple on an emergency subway ride and lampoons their pa-
tronizing view of their fellow passengers: When the, couple asks, 
"Who are these people?," one immediately thinks of the retort im-
plicit in the title of Louis Lusky's angry anti-gnostic polemic, By 
What Authority.4 And on the other side of the controversy stands 
Hugo Black's unanswerable question of why the framers even both-
ered to give us a written Constitution at all. 
Undeterred by these hazards, duly noted, Professor Ely in five 
tightly and delightfully written chapters states the case for confining 
judicial review to the tautology of procedural due process and avoid-
ing the catachresis of the "substantive" variety. Here, doing justice 
at retail by ensuring fair settlement of private disputes imperceptibly 
blends into the larger task of doing it at wholesale by ensuring open 
communication and fair representation so that the democratic pro-
cess may work its will. En route, Ely pauses at some fascinating way 
stations with engaging and provocative reflections on equal protec-
tion and the imposition of values. The one-liners are delicious. One 
jewel is the deadpan putdown of the straightforward requirement 
that the President be a natural-born citizen ("conceivably if improb-
3. See T. PLUCKNETI, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 296 (1956). 
4. L. LUSKY, BY WHAT AUTHORITY (1975). 
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ably here, a requirement of legitimacy ( or illegitimacy!) or non-Cae-
sarian birth") (p. 13). Another should exorcise conservative 
suspicion that the author is a liberal manque: "The Constitution 
may follow the flag, but is it really supposed to keep up with the New 
York Review of Books?" (p. 58). 
To be sure, a spoonful of sugar makes the medicine go down, but 
some readers have swallowed hard. Archibald Cox, alarmed over a 
possible overthrow of Roe v. Wade,5 is apprehensive whether Ely's 
formula can reach a like result. 6 Another reviewer, interpretivist 
guns blazing to the last, suggests that traditionalists have given up 
much too quickly on the historic specificity of privileges and immu-
nities.7 Indeed there is no doubt that nonamendatory interpretivism 
is a stabilizing and conserving doctrine: "Maybe at bottom I'm a 
conservative," once observed Justice Black. "I couldn't add to a bill 
of rights."8 
There are other irritants in the book. The suggestion for a suff o-
cating judicial oversight of the legislative process may only exacer-
bate the majoritarian backlash that the work was presumably written 
to impede. Moreover, the comment on reverse discrimination ("I 
have trouble understanding the place of righteous indignation on ei-
ther side of this wrenching moral issue") (p. 170) may well be read 
by many as the infuriating elitist insouciance of a tenured Harvard 
professor. 
Indeed, sooner or later this suspect attitude may prompt a re-
viewer for the National Review (or perhaps the Oral Roberts or Bob 
Jones Law Journal) to pounce and proclaim the Ely formulation a 
two-steps forward, one-step backward liberal ploy to defuse the ku!-
turkam_pf that judicial activism has unleashed and that currently 
finds expression in one-issue politics, withdrawal proposals, and sug-
gested constitutional amendments. The commentators might well in-
sist that the cat is out of the bag thanks to Archibald Cox's published 
anxieties on the future of Roe v. Wade under process-bound judicial 
review, accompanied as it is by Aesopian suggestions on how Ely's 
ideas could be reformulated to produce an unchanged result.9 
If Cox's essentially critical reception of the book augurs dissatis-
faction from the liberal left, literalists of the right are not without 
their own concerns. As noted, one reviewer suggests that resort to 
the historical linguistics, not to a new view of equal protection and 
fair representation, suffices to resolve the tension between majority 
5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
6. Cox, Book Review, 94 HARV. L. REV. 700, 710 (1981). 
7. Conant, Book Review, 34 VAND. L. REV. 233 (1981). 
8. D. Berman, Transcript of Conversation with Justice Black (Mar. 22, 1956) (Berman 
Papers, Berman Residence, Chevy Chase, Md.). 
9. Cox,supra note 6, at 710-11. 
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rule and minority rights, and does so without the extraconstitutional 
excursions that Ely would license.10 On this side of the spectrum 
persist the historic reservations about judicial review itself, an insti-
tution that minds as acute as those of Learned Hand and Hugo 
Black have found without explicit warrant in the constitutional text 
and justified only by necessity.u 
Since necessity knows no law, constitutional or otherwise, the 
centerline becomes a dangerous place. Perhaps by way of conse-
quence, few reviewers announce their conversion to the Ely thesis, 
and at least one judge has seen the proposal as proof positive of the 
Supreme Court's elitist distrust of popular democracy. 12 The rea-
sons are not hard to find. As Honor Tracy's Irish sermon suggested, 
half way between good and evil is still evil. For those who perceive 
judicial review as a monstrous fraud without warrant either in the 
original understanding or the received text (to borrow Justice 
Holmes's characterization of a judicial putsch), it is also beyond le-
gitimation by any lapse oftime or array of authority, even John Hart 
Ely's, and a little of it is as bad as a lot. And, similarly, those who 
cannot control the political process but who are riding high under 
raw judicial power will be reluctant to yield any area of it. 
But beyond the circumstance of Ely contra mundum, there is an-
other reason why the thesis fails. The American constitutional ex-
periment is shot through with tension and contradiction. 
Federalism, separation of powers, and majority rule versus minority 
right may well constitute its vital essence. One does not let sunlight 
in on mysteries, warned the eminent Victorian, Walter Bagehot, and 
Holmes contemporaneously cautioned that where distinctions are vi-
tal rather than formal, the problems should be existentially endured 
rather than rationally reconciled. 
10. Conant, supra note 7. 
11. See, e.g., L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 15 (1958); Cooper, Mr. Justice Hugo L. Black: 
Footnotes lo a Great Case, 24 ALA. L. REv. 1, 5 (1971). 
12. See Wengler v. Druggists Ins. Co., 601 S.W.2d 8, 9 (Mo. 1981) (Donnelly, J., 
concurring). 
